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I. ABSTRACT
In recent years, Twitter has seen a proliferation of automated
accounts or bots that send spam, offer clickbait, compromise
security using malware, and attempt to skew public opinion
[1], [2]. Previous research estimates that around 9% to 17%
of Twitter accounts are bots contributing to between 16% to
56% of tweets [3], [4] on the medium. This paper introduces
an unsupervised approach to detect Twitter spam campaigns
in real-time. The bot groups we detect tweet duplicate content
with shortened embedded URLs over extended periods of time.
Our experiments with the detection protocol reveal that bots
consistently account for 10% to 50% of tweets generated
from 7 popular URL shortening services on Twitter. More
importantly, we discover that bots using shortened URLs are
connected to large scale spam campaigns that control thou-
sands of domains. There appear to be two distinct mechanisms
used to control bot groups and we investigate both in this
paper. Our detection system runs 24/7 and actively collects
bots involved in spam campaigns and adds them to an evolving
database of malicious bots. We make our database of detected
bots available for query through a REST API so others can
filter tweets from malicious bots to get high quality Twitter
datasets for analysis.
II. INTRODUCTION
Twitter bots are accounts operated by programs instead of
humans [5]. Previous research estimates that 9% to 17% of
Twitter accounts are bots, and that between 16% to 56%
of tweet volume on Twitter is generated and propagated by
the bot population. Although some bot accounts such as
Earthquake Bot1 are beneficial to the community, many are
malicious. Our work focuses on malicious bot groups that
send tweets containing embedded URLs. URL-tweeting bots
are widely used by promotional campaigns to gain traffic to
their websites, by spammers to redirect users to phishing sites
and by malicious users as click bait to spread malware [6].
Prior work analyzing large Twitter datasets concludes that most
bots include URLs in tweets and that the average number of
URLs in tweets sent by bots is three times higher than the
number in tweets from human accounts [7]. Accounts tweeting
embedded URLs over extended time periods are more likely
to be malicious and are more likely to violate Twitter’s terms
of service2. Systematically detecting such malicious accounts
and flagging them for suspension or elimination is the goal of
our work.
1Earthquake Bot: https://twitter.com/earthquakebot?lang=en
2The Twitter Rules: https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311
Existing work on detecting Twitter spam campaigns is either
retrospective [1], where the analysis is done after accounts
are suspended by Twitter, or prospective, in which detection
is done while the accounts are still active. Most prospective
detection methods are supervised [8] or semi-supervised [9].
Even though some of these approaches focus on identifying
collective action among multiple accounts through the use
of embedded URLs, they still require manual labeling of
accounts to train classifiers for detecting malicious bots. Our
system, on the other hand, actively farms new spam campaigns
without any human intervention. Our completely unsupervised
detection approach enables us to build a blacklist of malicious
email addresses, URLs and Twitter accounts, and to share
threat intelligence with the research community in real-time.
Section III introduces our unsupervised, real-time Twitter
botnet and spam campaign detection system. Section IV shows
results of our month-long experiment and compares our ap-
proach with existing bot detection methods. Section V details
two mechanisms that spammers use to control Twitter bot
groups. Section VI summarizes our contribution.
III. METHOD
The bot detection system has a backend subsystem which
is responsible for detection and a frontend subsystem that
serves up results through application program interfaces (APIs)
and through visualizations. The backend subsystem consists
of five parts: a real-time Twitter abnormal trend monitor, a
job scheduler, a bot detection routine, a URL resolver and
a spam campaign classifier. The URL monitor collects and
monitors the top k URLs found in tweets on Twitter’s real-time
Streaming API, and the job scheduler collects shortened URLs.
Both types of tweet collections are passed through a pipeline
consisting of the bot detection routine, the URL resolver and
the spam campaign classifier.
The frontend consists of a web application and a set of APIs.
The web interface visualizes bot profiles and key statistics in a
table format and the API sends bot statistics in JSON format.
Both services are available to researchers who want to access
archived bot accounts found by our system.
A. Backend Subsystem
1) Real-time Twitter abnormal trend monitor: The real-time
Twitter trend monitor runs 24/7 to detect abnormal signals
in the Twitter stream. Currently, we use the keyword http
to collect any tweet that contains a URL. A counter in our
system stores and updates occurrences of the network location
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Fig. 1: Top: Real-time Twitter Bot Detection System. Bottom left: Percentages of daily tweets created by bots. The most abused
URL shortening service is dld.bz. One of the botnets using dld.bz stopped tweeting for several days in the middle of September,
which accounts for the sudden dip in the dld.bz curve. Bottom right: Our Twitter Bot Monitor shows a group of accounts that
superficially resemble Trump supporters.Their real objective is to inject malware by tricking users to click on shortened URLs.
The link to our Twitter Bot Monitor is http://water.clear.rice.edu:18000
part3 (netloc) of each URL collected. Using netloc gives us the
ability to perform a finer-grained subdomain-level analysis of
trending URLs. This is particularly useful because as we will
show in Section III, spammers abuse subdomain registration
to create spam campaigns. Our system keeps a white-list of
popular and trustworthy URLs, and anytime a non-white-listed
URL enters the top k list, our system automatically triggers
the bot detection routine and uses the network location part as
the input keyword to gather more tweets. The top k counter is
reset after n minutes to ensure that recent trending URLs have
a chance to enter the top k list. In our deployed system we use
k = 15 and n = 60. A larger k and a smaller n will capture
more bot activities, but the scale of the botnets (number of
accounts in a botnet, number of tweets generated by a botnet)
detected will be smaller.
3A general URL has a form scheme://netloc/path;parameters?query#
fragment
2) Job scheduler: The job scheduler schedules and triggers a
bot detection routine based on a predetermined list of keywords
at a predefined time interval. Currently, our system collects
bot groups from the seven most popular URL shortening
services on Twitter (bit.ly, goo.gl, ow.ly, tinyurl.com, dlvr.it,
if.ttt, dld.bz) every 24 hours. If a new URL shortening service
is detected by our abnormal trend monitor, we update the
list of URLs to be tracked by the job scheduler, which will
automatically begin the botnet detection protocol on the newly
added URL.
3) Bot detector: The bot detector consists of four parts.
A crawler collects live tweets based on input keywords. A
duplicate filter hashes each tweet text to a group of users and
identifies groups that tweet the same text. Groups with 20 or
more accounts are passed to the next stage. The threshold 20
ensures that only important groups are considered. A collector
then calls Twitter Rest API to collect the most recent 200
tweets from every account in a group, and calculates an
overlap ratio for each account between that account’s tweets
3and other tweets. If the ratio is higher than a threshold, the
account is flagged as a bot. This step ensures that we filter
out innocent users who happen to tweet the same text as
bots. A detector uses an unsupervised clustering algorithm
to find groups of accounts tweeting texts with high similarity.
Algorithm 1 shows the detailed clustering steps.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for detecting botnets
Input: α (minimum duplicate factor), β (overlap ratio),
a group G of n accounts a1, . . . , an,
sets T (a1), . . . , T (an) of tweets where T (ai) =
{ti1, . . . , ti200} of the 200 most recent tweets for each
account ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
1: C = ∅ /* most frequent tweet set */
2: S = ∅ /* bot account set */
3: for each user ai ∈ G do
4: if (|{i | t ∈ T (ai); 1 ≤ i ≤ n}| ≥ α) then
5: C = C ∪ {t}
6: end if
7: end for
8: for each user ai ∈ G do
9: if (ai ∈ S ⇐⇒ |T (ai)∩C||T (ai)| ≥ β) then
10: S = S ∪ {ai}
11: end if
12: end for
13: return C, S
There are two user-specified parameters in our detection
protocol: α, which we call minimum duplicate factor, which
influences the construction of the most frequent tweet set C,
and β, which we call the overlap ratio, which determines the
ratio of frequent tweets in the tweet set associated with an
account. We performed parameter tuning and chose α = 3
and β = 0.6 for our deployed detection algorithm. The results
of parameter tuning are included in Appendix A.
4) URL resolver: Once our system identifies a botnet, it
extracts all embedded URLs from each account’s past 200
tweets, finds the most frequent embedded URL in them, and
uses Selenium4 to simulate a web browser and checks if a URL
is malicious or not. The detailed algorithm is in Appendix B.
We look for two types of malicious behaviors: phishing
and use of secret URLs. Phishing redirects on the client
side by injecting Javascript code into a web page so that a
user who clicks on URL A will end up landing on URL
B, usually containing adware or malware. In a secret URL,
typing the network location part of the URL redirects a user
to a safe site, but the complete URL redirects to a spam
site. For example, in our dataset we find a spam website
vidisp.review. If a user visits vidisp.review directly, he will
be redirected to google.com. However, if a user visits a
URL containing vidisp.review embedded in a tweet, such
as vidisp.review/client/bqY8G/e57Nx/avg30/1VvQj, he will be
redirected to a spam web page.
5) Spam Campaign Classifier: After identifying botnets and
extracting malicious URLs, the final step is to identify spam
4Official documentation: http://www.seleniumhq.org/
campaigns. Our system queries the WHOIS database to get
registrant email for every malicious URL, then it builds a
dictionary that maps every registrant email address to a list
of botnets whose tweets contain URLs registered under that
email address. This reverse engineered map enables us to
identify malicious registrants who create thousands of domains
and control thousands of bot accounts. We record suspicious
registrant information in a blacklist that is used by our system
in subsequent detection efforts.
B. Frontend Subsystem
Fig. 1 shows a screenshot of our web application that
displays both group level and account level statistics of botnets.
The group level table displays the total number of accounts
in each bot group and the most frequent embedded URL
tweeted by that group. The account level table includes id,
screen name, statuses count, friends count, followers count,
user registration language and account creation time of every
account in a bot group. Along with the web portal, we also
provide a complete list of Restful APIs so researchers can get
archived bot statistics in JSON format by sending http requests
to our server5.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we present the landscape of URL-tweeting
Twitter bots and spam campaigns. We also compare our
approach with existing bot detection methods.
A. Level 1: Identify botnets
To establish a benchmark, we chose the nine most widely
used Twitter URL shortening services, collected 50,000 tweets
from each service, and ran our bot detection protocol. The
nine URL shortening services are bit.ly, ift.tt, ow.ly, goo.gl,
tinyurl.com, dlvr.it, dld.bz, viid.me and ln.is. Table I shows
percentages of bot accounts identified by our system and
account statuses we obtained by revisiting the Twitter API.
We compared our results with BotOrNot, a supervised,
account-based Twitter bot classifier. BotOrNot assigns a score
of 0 to 1 to an account based on more than 1000 features,
including temporal, sentiment-oriented and social network in-
formation [10]. A score closer to 0 suggests a human account,
while a score closer to 1 suggests a bot account. Based on
our previous work [4], the average BotOrNot score for the bot
groups we detect ranges from 0.44 to 0.71, and in 5 out of 9
datasets, more than 50% of BotOrNot scores fall in the range
of 0.4 and 0.6, which is an indeterminate classification. Few
accounts receive a score near 0 or 1.
In contrast to BotOrNot, one of the biggest advantages of
our unsupervised bot detection system is the ability to find new
bot groups in real-time. Our system currently executes daily
jobs that collect 30,000 tweets from the seven most active URL
shortening services6. Fig. 1 shows daily percentages of tweets
5For our complete API Documentation, visit
http://water.clear.rice.edu:18000/api.html
6The seven URL shortening services are bit.ly, ift.tt, ow.ly, goo.gl,
tinyurl.com, dlvr.it and dld.bz. Twitter has suspended viid.me and ln.is since
July, 2017.
4TABLE I: Statistics of Twitter accounts from nine URL
shortening services. Note the uptick in suspended accounts
identified by us on viid.me
URL
shortener
Total
# of
accts
Total
# of
bots
% bots
we
found
% our bots
susp. by
Twitter
by
6/10/17
% our bots
susp. by
Twitter
by
7/17/17
% our bots
susp. by
Twitter
by
9/25/17
bit.ly 28964 696 2.40% 3.74% 4.74% 8.91%
ift.tt 12543 321 2.56% 2.80% 9.97% 10.59%
ow.ly 28416 894 3.15% 45.30% 48.21% 48.43%
tinyurl.com 20005 705 3.52% 5.39% 7.66% 12.34%
dld.bz 6893 304 4.41% 8.22% 11.84% 18.75%
viid.me 2605 129 4.95% 38.76% 55.81% 63.57%
goo.gl 11250 710 6.31% 0.42% 3.24% 7.04%
dlvr.it 15122 1194 7.90% 7.37% 9.13% 9.46%
ln.is 25384 5857 23.07% 1.11% 1.25% 1.50%
created by bots from the seven URL shortening services on
Twitter over a two-month period. Tweets from bots consistently
account for 10% to 50% of tweet traffic with shortened URLs.
B. Level 2: Identify spam campaigns
We use the WHOIS database to retrieve domain registration
information of every suspicious URL in every botnet. We then
map registrant email to botnets to identify spam campaigns.
From September 10, 2017 to November 14, 2017, our de-
tection system identified 848 unique suspicious registration
emails behind 11,048 botnets with a total number of 185,922
accounts. We find that spammers create multiple domains as
proxy websites, whose only purpose is to link to the same
parent website. This link farming structure exploits search
engine optimization algorithms to elevate the ranking of the
parent website. A higher ranking means that more visitors
will be redirected to the parent spam website, endangering
more Internet users. Fig. 2 visualizes the workflow of a spam
campaign.
The scale of these spam campaigns is often very large.
Fig. 2 shows statistics of three large-scale campaigns we have
identified, whose recorded registration names are Giuseppe
Malfitano, Chris Matthew, and Shashank Vaishnav7. All three
spammers create phishing websites, and one of them (Chris
Matthew) has also created websites with secret URLs. They
register a large number of domains that contain attractive
words (such as news, best, awesome) to lure users to click their
links. Many domains are not live yet which means that they are
registered but do not have associated IP addresses. We believe
that these dormant domains will become active to serve spam
content once the currently active domains are blocked. For this
reason it is important for domain registration companies and
social media companies to preempt spam activities by blocking
both active and non-active domains registered by suspicious
registrants such as these, identified by our system.
7These names are provided by the WHOIS database. Since many domain
registrars do not check the validity of registration name, these could well be
fictitious.
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Registrant name Giuseppe Malfitano Chris Matthew Shashank Vaishnav
Registrant email gima23@bullhost.de lascan.ioan@ gmail.com support@vatsana.co
Registrar GoDaddy Namecheap Wild West Domains
Associated 
Domains 11 1807 5396
Registered 
Domains (Partial)
i5-news.com 
i7-news.com 
a6-news.com 
a8-news.com
bestfunnny.us 
bestcoolapp.us 
bestbestnews.us 
bestpicz.us
awesomepix.info 
awesomepost.info 
awesomestuff.info 
awesomethingz.info
Abused URL 
shortening 
services
dlvr.it, goo.gl bit.ly dlvr.it, goo.gl, bit.ly
Number of Twitter 
bot accounts 193 971 1513
Fig. 2: Top: workflow of a spam campaign. Bottom: three large
scale campaigns identified by our system. To evade detection,
a spammer will create malicious websites, register for several
URL shortening services, and use botnets to send shortened
URLs that redirect users to these websites.
V. HOW DO SPAMMERS CONTROL BOTNETS? CASE
STUDY: FROM CREATING BOT ACCOUNTS TO HIJACKING
NORMAL ACCOUNTS
In this section, we describe two general mechanisms that
spammers use to control botnets. A traditional approach is to
register a large number of accounts under a single user name,
and a more unconventional approach is to build a Twitter app to
hijack normal users’ credentials. Current bot detection methods
that operate at the level of an individual account have difficulty
detecting users comprised by the second mechanism. In con-
trast, our system correctly identifies coordinated bot activities
resulting from both mechanisms weeks before Twitter detects
and flags or suspends these accounts. Here we document four
case studies that show how those two bot control mechanisms
work on Twitter.
A. Traditional bot groups (savingzev and club)
On February 25, 2017, our system detected a large number
of trending URLs that use .us as their top-level domain, a
variety of second-level domains, and the same subdomain
savingzev (for example: savingzev.feedsted.us). These URLs
5all redirected to a phishing website with low quality content
mixed with links to malware. Two weeks later, on March 27,
2017, Twitter introduced a link unsafe warning message before
redirecting the user to those sites.
On April 13, 2017, our system detected a list of URLs with
.club as top-level domain and a range of second-level domains
(for example: likelisi.club). Similar to savingzev, the final
landing URL pointed to a phishing news website. When we
revisited these URLs in September 2017 they were no longer
valid domain names and Twitter appeared to have suspended
83% of the associated accounts.
TABLE II: Domain registration information of four Twitter bot
groups
Bot group du3a twitbr savingzev club
Date
detected
Long-lasting 09/28/17 02/25/17 04/13/17
Domains
detected
(partial)
du3a.org
d3waapp.org
ghared.com
twits.tk
twitbr.tk
viraltt.tk
savingzev.renewsfeed.us
savingzev.qualifystory.us
savingzev.feedsted.us
takensi.club
takenst.club
likelino.club
likelisi.club
Top level
domain
.org
.com
.tk .us .club
Total #
of
accts
38262 4706 1243 3229
Total #
of bots
32591 1526 1238 941
% bots 85.18% 32.34% 99.60% 29.14%
% tweets
from
bots
85.03% 29.82% 99.99% 85.70%
% our bots
susp. by
Twitter
until
10/01/17
00.00% 00.00% 96.28% 83.21%
Traditional bot groups register domains and Twitter accounts
in batches [11]. Table II shows that domain names of savingzev
and club groups have similar lexical features. Savingzev abuses
subdomain registration by adding subdomain savingzev before
every second-level domain as a unique address without having
to purchase a new domain name. Similarly, Club group abuses
top-level domain providers by registering with a lesser-known
domain .club. Previous research [1] also notes that spammers
“rely on free subdomains to avoid registration costs”, or
use subdomains to inflate search engine results on certain
keywords. We looked up domain registration information on
WHOIS database for all top 20 trending domains on Twitter
containing subdomain savingzev on February 25, 2017 and
found they were all created by one registrant with one email
address on February 24, 2017, one day before the launch of
Twitter bot activity.
B. Unconventional bot groups (du3a and twitbr)
A new mechanism for spreading spam and malware on
Twitter is that a malicious Twitter user will first create a
Twitter app, and then encourage ordinary Twitter users to
subscribe to the service provided by the app. After getting
authorized, the app reads tweets from the user’s timeline, gets
the user’s followers, follows new accounts and post tweets on
the user’s behalf. With enough number of subscribed users,
a malicious user has the power and resources to launch bot
activity by hijacking and abusing subscribed accounts, until a
user rechecks his or her account and disables the app.
On September 28, 2017, our real-time Twitter abnormal
trend monitor detected twitbr.tk, a social media managing
app, entering the top k URL list. This triggered our bot
detection protocol with keyword twitbr. We observed Twitter
users complaining about twitbr.tk on social media and posting
solutions on how to disable the app. To understand how
this app spreads spam, we subscribed to the app using an
experimental Twitter account. Seconds after the registration,
the app started to tweet malicious links, and begin tagging
friends of our experimental account. Three URLs, twits.tk,
twitbr.tk, and viraltt.tk were used to launch this spam activity.
The uncommon top-level domain .tk is abused in a similar
manner as .club. As of October 22, 2017, Twitter flagged
twitbr.tk as dangerous and has taken down the application, but
other variations of such URLs are still trending on Twitter.
Also belonging to this group is a family of prayer tweeting
apps, whose domain names include du3a.org, d3waapp.org,
ghared.com, zad-muslim.com. Those apps tweet in Arabic,
have a large user base, and are long standing members of our
top k URL list. Legitimate Twitter users authorize these apps
to send prayers on their behalf. Although the prayer tweeting
service is innocuous and Twitter has permitted them to function
unimpeded, a recent study by Berger and Morgan stated that
“some ISIS supporting Twitter accounts used bots and apps
to facilitate their activity on Twitter.[12]” Berger and Morgan
also noted that “these apps introduce noise into social networks
and their use may be intended to impede analysis.”
C. Results and Comparisons
We now detail how Twitter has responded to these four
groups and explain differences between traditional botnets and
botnets assembled from hijacked accounts. Table II shows
the number of bot accounts identified by our unsupervised
approach and their statuses after revisiting Twitter API. Note
that even though all four groups have high proportions of
bot accounts, Twitter aggressively suspended savingzev and
club groups but did not suspend accounts from du3a and twits
groups, because these accounts are owned by legitimate users
who are unlikely to be aware of their accounts’ activities.
To demonstrate that traditional bot groups are much more
homogeneous than unconventional groups, we collected ac-
count profile data from Twitter Rest API. Fig. 3 shows the
scatter plot of statuses count, friends count and followers count
and account creation time. It is clear that savingzev accounts
are highly clustered and are created in a batch by one or a few
people, while du3a groups are randomly distributed in the 3D
space and have a more uniform creation time distribution.
Even though these two bot coordination mechanisms are
very different, our group-based, unsupervised approach is able
6Fig. 3: Scatter plots (statuses count, friends count and followers
count) and account creation time plots of savingzev (left
column) and du3a (right column) groups. See Sections V.A.
and V.B. for explanation.
to detect spam activity generated by both of them in real-time.
Further, we identify the root cause of the threat, i.e., whether
it is from a Twitter application hijacking user accounts or a
botnet created by conventional means.
VI. CONCLUSION
We design and implement an unsupervised system to detect
Twitter spam campaigns that use bot groups to send duplicate
content with embedded URLs. We show that bots consistently
account for 10% - 50% of tweet traffic from URL shorten-
ing services by conducting measurements using the Twitter
Streaming API over a two-month period. By mapping domain
registration information to botnets, we find large scale spam
campaigns that control thousands of malicious websites and
bot accounts. We illustrate two different mechanisms spam-
mers use to control Twitter botnet: creating a large number of
accounts registered under a single user, and creating a single
Twitter application that co-opts legitimate accounts. Finally, we
create a web application that monitors the top k trending URLs
on Twitter and visualizes the botnets and spam campaigns we
have identified. We provide API interfaces for easy access
to the database of such botnets. We hope that our findings
can reduce spam and malware on Twitter and improve the
quality of Twitter datasets used for social network and content
analysis.
APPENDIX A
PARAMETER TUNING
Minimum duplicate factor (α) and overlap ratio (β) are two
parameters used in our detection protocol. High values of α
and β correspond to a more homogeneous bot group. If we
set those two parameters too low, the false positive rate will
increase, whereas if we set them too high, the false negative
rate will increase. To find an appropriate setting, we apply
elbow method where we choose a number such that increasing
the value does not affect much about the outcome.
Fig. 4 shows the sensitivity of minimum duplicate factor α,
with a fixed overlap ratio of 0.6. Other than viid.me dataset,
performance of the detection method is not sensitive to the
choice of minimum duplicate factor. The largest marginal
decrease of bot accounts is from 2 to 3, so we choose an
α = 3 as the minimum duplicate factor.
Fig. 5 shows the sensitivity of overlap ratio, with a fixed
minimum duplicate factor equal to 3. Interestingly, this pa-
rameter is more sensitive to URL shortening services bit.ly,
dlvr.it, goo.gl, ift.tt and viid.me, but less sensitive to dld.bz,
ln.is, ow.ly and tinyurl.com. This suggests that accounts using
the first five URL shortening services are more heterogeneous
with fewer identical tweets, while accounts tweeting from the
other four services are more homogeneous. An exception is
viid.me dataset, whose bot accounts are all injecting malwares,
but do not always tweet duplicate content. This group is more
sophisticated and requires further investigation. For all URL
shortening services, the number of bot accounts decreases as
the overlap ratio increases. We choose an overlap ratio of 0.6
because that is where plots start to plateau.
Fig. 4: Variation in number
of detected bots as a function
of minimum duplicate factor
with fixed overlap ratio = 0.6
Fig. 5: Variation in number of
detected bots as a function of
overlap ratio with fixed mini-
mum duplicate factor = 3
APPENDIX B
URL RESOLVING ALGORITHM
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